Introduction
In 2016 the Republic of Ireland joined over fifty countries worldwide in the adoption of candidate gender quotas. Introduced via the Electoral Reform Act of 2012, this quota stipulated that the slate of candidates running for each party be composed of no less than thirty per cent of either gender, which effectively meant Irish parties had to find a lot more women to run in a very short space of time. Parties failing to reach this threshold would be punished by the halving of their state funding for the duration of the upcoming legislative term. Given the heavy reliance of political parties on state monies and the possible negative electoral consequences for failing to nominate sufficient numbers of women, it is not surprising that there was a large increase in the number of female candidates selected to run in 2016. In 2011 a mere 86 women ran for election, compared with 163 five years later. This sudden influx of a very large number of female nominees into the candidate pool offers us an excellent opportunity to definitively examine whether Irish voters are truly gender blind.
Previous research (McElroy and Marsh, 2010; has found little evidence of voter prejudice against female candidates. Nonetheless, as recently as January 2016, the country had the ignominious honour of ranking 111th in the world in terms of the number of women it elected to its lower house (a position it shared with both Koreas). The upward trend, visible in other European democracies in the past two decades, in the percentage of women elected to national assemblies had not been mirrored in Ireland, where the per cent of female TDs had stagnated in low double digits for years. The question of why a country which does rather well on other measures of gender equality (e.g. the World Economic Forum's Gender Index) and where voters are seemingly gender blind does not manage to elect more women to its parliament is puzzling. Ireland is a better country than most in which to be a woman, in terms of educational, health and economic indicators, but this is not reflected in levels of political representation.
Much of the blame for this lack of progress has been levelled at political parties failing to nominate women to run (McGing, 2013) and the new gender quota was designed to resolve this very issue. But a lingering question over voter bias remains. International experimental research regularly demonstrates voter bias against female candidates (Fox and Smith 1998; Smith et al. 2007 ), but aggregate and public opinion analysis fails to replicate this (Black and Erikson, 2003; Dolan, 1998; Seltzer et al., 1997) . Recent attempts to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings suggest that there is a quality gap between male and female candidates and that failure to control for this accounts for the puzzling results (Anzia and Berry, 2011; Fulton, 2012) . This emerging body of work argues that male and female candidates are not equivalent; women who run for office are, on average, more accomplished and capable than their male contenders and this quality gap masks voter bias.
Female candidates confront greater hurdles in the selection process for any number of reasons: a lack of self-belief, (Lawless and Fox, 2005) , greater competition to be chosen (Lawless and Pearson, 2008) , or outright selectorate bias (Sanbonmatsu, 2006) . Thus, women who manage to get selected and survive the ardours of the campaigning process are of very high quality and voters recognizing this reward them with their vote. However, with the introduction of the quota in 2016 we essentially have an exogenous shock to the system: parties were forced to find a large number of women very quickly, so the recruitment pool is likely to have more 'average' women in it. As such, we can now test for true bias amongst the Irish electorate.
In what follows, we first examine the aggregate data for evidence of voter bias, both historically and in 2016. We then explore the individual level survey evidence from the exit poll data, and finally we use some new individual level data on voter traits to examine if there is a personality type that is predisposed to voting for female candidates.
The Historical Context
The number of women running in Irish elections has, historically, been very low, so low in fact that until the 1970s the absolute number of women competing at election time rarely reached double digits and, even then, many of these were what might be classified as 'honorary men' -the widows, daughters and sisters of dead male TDs. For instance, of three women elected to the Dáil in 1965, one was a daughter and two were the widows of former TDs (indeed one of them -Brigid Hogan Higgins -was also married to a sitting male TD).
Similarly, in 1954 only five women were elected to the Dáil and four of these were the widows of former TDs, first elected after a husband's death left the spot vacant.
However, there was a significant increase in the number of women running for election in the 1970s and 1980s, as illustrated in Figure 9 .1, in parallel with the rise of the international women's movement and Irish membership of the European Economic Community. 
FIGURE 9.2 ABOUT HERE
In part, the problem is that incumbency is such a strong predictor of getting re-elected in Ireland (Matland and Studlar, 2004) and most incumbents are men (especially in the two largest parties). Parties naturally re-nominate these candidates as part of their seat maximization strategy. On the other hand, 85 per cent of non-incumbents running in 2011
were also men. In a gender-neutral environment, even with deference to the re-selection of incumbent male TDs, one might reasonably expect non-incumbents to divide roughly equally (with some volatility) amongst male and female candidates. In 2011, only 20 per cent of non-incumbent Fianna Fáil candidates were women (the equivalent figure for Fine Gael was also 20 per cent, while it was 23 per cent for Labour). Until 2016, the main political parties were simply not selecting women to run. An exploration of the reasons for this failure to nominate women is beyond the scope of this chapter, but runs the gamut from outright bias to a lack of women candidates coming forward. Here we will rather focus on what happens when women actually do run. Have Irish women done as well as men when their names are on the ballot?
The first cut at this question examines the evidence from the aggregate data on all candidates who ran for the Dáil from the early 1970s onwards (given how few women ran prior to this, there is little point in extending the analysis further back in time 
Aggregate Analysis 2016
The anticipated impact of the gender quota was the subject of considerable media coverage in the run-up to the election. In particular, speculation was rife as to whether the two biggest parties would be able to meet the 30 per cent threshold or whether they would, at the close of nominations, simply run a bunch of 'no-hoper' female candidates to satisfy the requirement.
Fianna Fáil was particularly challenged, in that they had failed to elect a single woman in 2011. To meet the gender quota, party headquarters had to introduce a gender directive to compel local selection conventions to nominate more women (in some cases quite controversially: e.g. Longford Westmeath). As was clearly demonstrated in Figure 9 .2, the rise in the percentage of women running was highest for both of the largest parties, Fianna 1 Exact question wording was as follows: 'Candidate gender quotas for political parties were introduced for these elections to the Dáil. How much do you support the use of gender quotas for national elections on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means strongly oppose and 10 means strongly support?' 2 Under the Single Transferable Vote system measuring candidate 'success' is not trivial. While winning a seat is what candidates ultimately care about, this dichotomous measure is somewhat crude and loses a lot of the information available on candidate performance. There are several alternative measures available such as share of the vote, share of a quota, absolute number of votes (controlling for votes cast in each constituency), deviation from the average share won by candidates from a district and deviation from the average share won by the candidate's party in a district. These measures are correlated with each other but far from perfectly, and this matters when we are examining levels of significance. Given no strong theoretical reason to use one measure over another, we deploy three alternative measures of success in this chapter.
a constituency and V ci gives candidate i's vote total
This approach is intended to capture how well a candidate did, in terms of his or her total number of first preferences, relative to other candidates in the election, controlling for the different number of votes cast in each constituency. The correlation between the two dependent variables is, as one might expect, very high, but we use both as they capture slightly different aspects of electoral performance.
The key variable of interest in the analysis is, again, the candidate's Gender but we also control for a number of other characteristics. In particular, we are interested in measuring the 'quality' of a candidate, though the concept is notoriously difficult to operationalize, especially for challengers. In general, the literature has focused on quality as measured in terms of political experience, especially incumbency status (Squire, 1992; Van Dunk, 1997; Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996) and has found that this has a positive impact on election outcomes. We thus control for the incumbency status of each candidate and additionally ministerial experience (arguably those chosen for ministerial positions should be of even higher quality than backbenchers). Of course, these two variables may not measure quality per se, but rather may capture name recognition or an ability to deliver pork (the latter is especially relevant for the ministerial variable). And, even more importantly, neither of these variables helps us differentiate between high-quality and mediocre non-incumbents.
While incumbent performance is directly observable to voters and thus should be easy for them to evaluate (see, however, the discussion in Wlezien, 2016) the question of how to assess challenger quality is more problematic. To attempt to get some further leverage over candidate quality, we also control for whether or not the candidate has served as a County or City Councillor. This measure may also be tainted by a degree of name recognition but it does capture some aspect of quality for challengers or, at least, an ability to win a race. Fiftyone per cent of candidates in 2016 were or had been councillors at some stage. Although only 43 per cent of women had been councillors, compared with 56 per cent of male contenders.
Finally, we also control for campaign spending (measured as per cent of the spending limit) as previous research has found a positive relationship between spending and votes (Benoit and Marsh, 2010) , especially for challengers. Arguably the ability to raise significant funds is also a measure of candidate credibility and quality or, at a minimum, campaign effort A linear regression model was run using both dependent variables and as is clear from Figure 9 .5 the Gender of the candidate is once more insignificant. 4 Incumbency is a strong predictor of vote getting, as is being a councillor. Campaign spending was also highly predictive of getting a bigger per cent of the quota or a higher than average number of 1 st preference votes. None of the interaction terms reached standard levels of significance with the, interesting, exception of Gender interacted with running for Fianna Fáil, which was again negatively signed (see Models 1 and 2 in Table A9 .1). Thus, it does seem to be the case that In an ideal world we would have far better measures of candidate quality, such as details like candidate work histories and educational attainment, though whether voters have this level of knowledge about challengers and act on it is debateable. In the field of economics, candidate quality is typically measured in terms of years in full time education (e.g. Baltrunaite, 2014) and in future work collecting and coding this variable for all candidates will be worthwhile. But as one final check of the impact of quality on election outcomes, we also ran a model with a crude control for educational attainment. Given the difficulty of collecting these data, the sample is much smaller, with information available for only 273 of the candidates (just under 50 per cent of the total). This includes all those who 3 Campaign spending limits were as follows: €30,150 in three seat constituencies, €37,650 in four seaters and €45,200 in five seaters 4 Not all variables in the model are presented in Figure 9 .5. For those, see Table A9 .1 in the Appendix.
were elected (for whom biographical information is more readily available) and 129 of the With due consideration to the caveat that the analysis is only run on half the universe of candidates and this is almost certainly not a representative sample, the same regression models were run as before with the inclusion of the variable for educational achievement (and a term interacting education and gender). 5 The results are presented in Figure 9 .6: yet again, the gender of the candidate is not significant but having served as a councillor, total spend and incumbency remain so. Education is, additionally, a predictor of obtaining a higher percentage of the quota, even when measured crudely in this trichotomous fashion (though the interaction of education with candidate gender is not, as is demonstrated in models 3 and 4 in Table A9 .1).
6 Thus candidate quality, however measured, does seem to matter to Irish voters; however, it does not seem to have a gendered dimension to it. There is clearly considerable scope for exploration of this quality dimension in future work and, in particular, data on years in fulltime education for all candidates should be collated. Left-Right in Ireland is not underpinned by coherent ideological dispositions). We also include a variable, PARTY ID, which measures the strength of the respondent's party identification; we reason that where this is strong, the voter will be driven to vote the party line regardless of the gender of the candidate. PARTY ID is measured using a dichotomous variable, where 1 is feeling close to a particular party and 0 is not. PARTY CENTRED VOTER captures how important the candidate rather than the party is for the respondent.
This measure is a three-point scale and ranges from -1 (candidate centred) to 1 (party centred). 8 Given the results of the aggregate analysis, we also control for whether the candidate was an INCUMBENT and running for a party to which the voters was close (PARTY CANDIDATE). We also include interactions between female respondent and all of these variables to see if there are some particular types of female respondents who are more inclined to vote for women. Nor do we find evidence that any particular sub-group of women respondents is more inclined to vote for women candidates (none of the interaction terms are significant in either of the models and as such are not presented in the figures, but full results are presented in Table A9 .2 in the appendix for the interested reader). We do, however, find that more educated and middle class voters are slightly more inclined to express a preference for a woman and education is on the verge of significance for high preference voting also (though the class effect is not). But overall, what seems to matter to voters when they choose to give a vote to a woman, echoing the findings from the aggregate analysis, is that the candidate in question is an incumbent and running for a party they are close to.
FIGURES 9.7A AND 9.7B AROUND HEREOn the whole, the analysis in this section suggests that there are few identifiable characteristics of voters that make them more inclined to vote for a female candidate. These results echo much international survey research, which finds that voters do not differentiate between candidates on gender grounds. In the final section, we explore whether there are any distinguishing personality traits of those who vote for women.
The Psychology of Voting for Women
In the previous section we found that standard demographic characteristics such as class, age and ideology have little to no explanatory power in predicting who will vote for a female candidate. But are there certain types of people who are more likely to vote for women, in terms of their general personality dispositions?
A large body of research in psychology has established that there are five basic elements that account for differences in personality: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Emotional Stability. The general hypothesis that personality affects all types of human behaviour is well established in empirical work and the five-factor model has become the cornerstone of trait psychology since the 1980s. While there are other approaches, these five broad elements are now largely accepted as jointly covering the majority of personality structure. Openness refers to 'the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual's mental and experiential life ' (John et al., 2008: 120) . Conscientiousness is identified as 'socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task-and goal-directed behaviour, such as thinking before acting, delaying gratification, following norms and rules, and planning, organizing, and prioritizing tasks ' (John et al., 2008: 120) . People with high scores for Extraversion have 'an energetic approach to the social and material world [and it] includes traits such as sociability, activity and assertiveness, and positive emotionality" (John et al., 2008: 120) . Agreeable individuals are 'pro-social and communal in orientation as opposed to antagonistic to others, they display traits such as modesty, tender mindedness trust and altruism ' (John et al., 2008: 120) . Finally, Emotional Stability (also referred to as Neuroticism) contrasts traits such as nervousness, sadness and anxiety with even temperedness and general emotional well-being.
Three decades of study have finely tuned both the meaning and measurement of these concepts and this 'Big Five' model is now the 'the most widely used and extensively researched measure of personality' (Gosling et al., 2003: 506) . Recent work in political science, drawing on this literature, has established that there is a significant relationship between these personality traits and ideological dispositions and, to a lesser extent, levels of political participation (Mondak, 2010; Gerber et al., 2011) . In particular, it has been established that Conscientiousness is associated with conservative political values in voters (Alford and Hibbing, 2007; Gosling et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2003; Mondak, 2010) , while those who are Open to new experiences tend to be more liberal (Carney et al., 2008; Schoen and Schumann, 2007) . The findings with regard to the other three traits,
Agreeableness, Extraversion and Neuroticism are, as of yet, less settled. While
Agreeableness has been associated with, for instance, more liberal values in Italy and
Germany the result has not been found to hold in studies of US voters. Although Emotional Stability has been found to predict ideological self-placement in both the US and Germany, the relationship is in the opposite direction, with high levels of Neuroticism being associated with centre-left voting in Germany but voting for the Republicans in the US (Schoen and Schumann, 2007; Mondak and Halperin, 2008) . Finally, while Extraversion has been linked to levels of political participation, such as turnout, it has not been systematically associated with voter ideology, though those who score high on extraversion are more likely to be strong party identifiers (Gerber et al., 2011; 2012) .
There is very little research on the 'Big Five' and Irish voters, however a brief battery of questions, which aimed to measure these traits in Irish voters, was included in the 2016
INES3 and here we examine if any of these personality dispositions is predictive of voting for women. The standard battery of 10 questions that captures the main underlying predispositions of personality was included in the telephone recall survey, conducted by Red C, and we utilise these data to examine whether or not voting for women is associated with certain personality types (see Appendix Table A9 .3 for the full set of questions). First, we explore whether we see similar patterns in personality difference between men and women in
Ireland. Sex differences in personality traits have been found to be larger and more consistent (across time and culture) than sex differences in other domains such as cognitive ability or self-esteem (Else-Quest et al., 2006; Hyde, 2005) . These differences in personality have been found to cross national borders. Feingold (1994) found that women in Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Russia scored higher than men on scales related to the personality traits of neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Men scored higher in the extraversion-related trait of assertiveness. One slightly odd finding is that sex differences in personality traits are often larger in developed countries (Europe and North American) with egalitarian cultures, compared with Asian and African states (Costa et al., 2001; McCrae, 2002; Schmitt et al., 2008) . Generally, the psychology literature has demonstrated that men tend to be more assertive than women, and women are generally higher than men in anxiety and tender-mindedness/sensitivity (Brody and Hall, 2000; Feingold, 1994; Kring and Gordon, 1998; Lynn and Martin, 1997) . And indeed, as illustrated in Figure 9 .8, we find that there are gendered differences on two of the five factors in Ireland -Neuroticism and Agreeableness, with women more like to describe themselves as sensitive than men but also more friendly.
10
However, there are no significant differences in levels of conscientiousness and extraversion, which is at odds with the findings from most other advanced industrial democracies.
FIGURE 9.8 ABOUT HERE
Given these questions on personality were asked in a short telephone survey, conducted in the weeks after the election (INES3), we unfortunately do not have access to the full range of voting preferences provided by the mock ballots (INES1), which we used in the previous section. Respondents were, however, asked to name the candidate to whom they gave their first preference and in the following analysis we take advantage of this information to see if we can isolate personality traits that make a voter more likely to vote for a woman than a man. 11 Given that the earlier analysis confirmed the importance of party for voters' first preference choice, we confine our analysis to those respondents who could choose between a male and female candidate running for the same party. This approach is necessarily restrictive and reduces the sample considerably, as Fine Gael only ran a male and a female candidate in 19 of 40 constituencies, while the equivalent figures for Fianna Fáil is 17, for Sinn Féin 6 and for Labour just 2. There were independent candidates of both genders running in 23 constituencies. Furthermore, we are forced to make the limiting assumption that party trumps gender in this particular model. We also do not have access to questions that would permit us to differentiate party centred from non-party centred voters. With these caveats in mind, we run a logit where the dependent variable codes voting for a female candidate as 1 (0 otherwise). The key variables of interest are the 'Big Five', as detailed above. Given other work in political science that finds Openness is correlated with liberal attitudes and Conscientiousness with conservative values, our expectation is that these will have the strongest influence on propensity to vote for female candidates (openness should be positively signed and conscientiousness negatively signed). Extraversion has not been found 10 Distributional differences are statistically significant using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for Openness and Neuroticism.
11 Just slightly over three quarters of respondents could (or were willing) to name their first preference candidate, thereby reducing the sample.
to correlate with voter ideology and the results on Neuroticism and Agreeableness vary by country, as such we have no strong expectations related to these three traits. We again control for the Age, Class, Gender, Education and Ideology of the voter, plus their attitude to the quota. We also control for whether or not the party (or independents taken as a group) to which the respondent gave his or her first preference had an incumbent female in the constituency, as incumbency has been found to be such a strong predictor of vote getting in the earlier sections.
The results of the logit model suggest that few of the 'Big Five' traits are significant predictors of giving a first preference to a woman. The only variable that was significantly related to giving a first preference to a female candidate was Openness to Experience, which captures a respondent's willingness to try new things and a degree of unconventionality.
Extraversion is, surprisingly, negatively related to giving a first preference to a woman but this effect is only significant at the 0.1 level: in future work, with a larger sample and a more refined dependent variable, we will see if this relationship holds. Unsurprisingly, if the party of the candidate the respondent voted for has a female incumbent, the voter is more likely to vote for a female and interestingly, QUOTA SUPPORT does reach significance in this model.
As is clear from Figure 9 .9 most of the other variables in the model fail to reach standard levels of significance, but once more education and class are positively signed, a pattern that fits with the analysis in the previous section. Overall, the analysis suggests the more curious and less conventional are more likely to cast a vote for a female candidate. However, it is worth repeating, that this analysis of Irish voter traits and their impact on voting behaviour is in its infancy and future work, with higher quality data, is required. Gender quotas, for an election that was likely to be more than four years down the line, did not seem like a top priority. While a handful of women's groups and academics had been lobbying for their introduction for some years, there was little public interest in or awareness of the gap in representation. Gender has never been very politicized in Irish electoral campaigns or, indeed, politics more generally. Furthermore, the quota was likely to pose a problem for the main governing party, Fine Gael, though clearly not as much of a problem as for its main rival, Fianna Fáil. Nonetheless, the bill became law in July 2012 and the 2016 general election was the first to operate under its provisions. 
